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NOTES
The court also must determine whether or not the land devoted to
the new use will greater benefit the public. The burden of proving that
the proposed use would render greater benefit should be on the con-
demnor. However, if the statute grants the general power to condemn
property already devoted to public use, then the burden of proof should
shift to the property owner, for it seems the legislature has thereby created
a presumption that the new use is superior. The power of eminent domain
exists to promote the general welfare; the burden of safeguarding this
purpose is on the courts.
DISESTABLISHMENT: NLRB'S WANING REMEDY AND
THE INTERNATIONAL UNIONS
Triumph for the local union affiliated with an organized labor
movement independent of employers was not an historical inevitability.
Varied and subtle forces, among which governmental policy has played
a much disputed role, have conspired to defeat its rival, the company
union.1 That rival's "wayward cousin," the company-dominated union,
has long been the object of statutory prohibition, but many critics have
believed that prior to 1947 the National Labor Relations Board did not
sufficiently distinguish between the two.2 Congress, in 1948, demanded
that unions affiliated with national organizations be treated as harshly
or as lightly as their independent competitors; the Board has since at-
tempted to be nondiscriminatory. Nevertheless, the considerations intro-
duced by affiliation with a national union change the nature of the prob-
lem, and, unless past endeavors to cope with employer domination are
correctly understood, present efforts may cause more difficulties than
they resolve.
While the origin of company unionism in the United States can be
attributed to several factors,8 periods of expansion were undeniably due
1. The term "company union" is used to denote an organization of employees exist-
ing for the purpose of dealing with management and confined to one company or one
plant of a company. It is not to be confused with the term "company-dominated" union.
2. Hereafter referred to as the "Board" or as "NLRB".
3. "One of these was a growing demand that something should be done to provide
in large-scale industry a substitute for the immediate personal contact between worker
and employer which existed in the days of small establishments. Employers felt the need
of some machinery for the adjustment of grievances and complaints and for collective
discussion about work and working conditions. Some adopted the company union,
believing this provided the avenue for better understanding between management and
employees, which would bring benefits not only to the workers but also to the employer
in improved morale.
"Another important factor contributing toward the movement was the insistent
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to a series of statutes which recognized the right of employees to bar-
gain collectively with employers concerning grievances and conditions
of employment. 4 Employers, forced to allow some form of organiza-
tion by their employees, turned to the company union as an alternative
to the established union movement. 5 From their viewpoint, the "out-
side" affiliated union, as opposed to an "inside" representative for their
employees, was a more serious threat to management prerogatives. This
was particularly true where the "inside" union was a mere tool in the
hands of the employer-ineffective in representing employee interests.
In 1935, the Wagner Act made collective bargaining the national
labor policy and employer domination of a union an unfair labor prac-
tice subject to a cease and desist order from the NLRB.6 The Board,
however, felt that, in addition to this negative order, an affirmative
remedy was necessary. 7 It determined that an employer who had, in fact,
dominated a labor organization should completely disestablish that organi-
zation as the bargaining representative of his employees.,
The language of the Board in the early cases did not establish dearly
what the result of such an order might be. "Loose terms" and "ambigu-
ous language," as described by at least one writer,9 left one to wonder
if the union had to be dissolved or merely not recognized by the employer
as an organization for collective bargaining. At that time one could also
have questioned whether the order entailed a permanent withdrawal of
recognition or only withdrawal until the organization was free from
the employer's domination and could be freely selected by the employees
as their bargaining representative.' 0
demand of workers for collective bargaining through trade-unions, and the employers
growing recognition that this demand must either be met or a substitute found for it.
In the opinion of many employers the company union offered a desirable means for
group dealing, without the other characteristics of trade-unions which they considered
onerous." Characteristics of Company Unions 1935, DE,'T LABoR BuLL. No. 634
2(1937), hereafter cited as "Characteristics of Company Unions."
4. See, e.g., Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1946);
National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT. 195 (1933); Characteristics of Company
Unions 19-28; Note, 40 COL. L. REv. 278, 279 (1940) and literature cited in notes 3, 4,
and 5 therein- Comment, 36 MicH. L. REv. 1131, 1132-1135 (1938).
5. Note, 40 COL. L. REv. 278 (1940).
6. 49 STAT. 449, 452, 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), 160(c), (Supp.
1951); the sections in the Wagner Act pertaining to employer unfair labor practices
were only slightly changed by the subsequent enactment of the Taft-Hartley Amend-
ment.
7. Section 10(c) authorizes the Board "... to take such affirmative action . . . as
will effectuate the policies of this Act.....
8. For an analysis of the development of affirmative remedies for employer dom-
ination previous to the Wagner Act, see Characteristics of Company Unions 209-256.
9. 13 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 178, 181 (1938).
10. For example, in at least three early cases, Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,'
NOTES
Courts, asked to enforce disestablishment orders, were somewhat
perplexed by the ambiguity in the Board's usage of the term. One court
intimated that the order was not permanent and that a disestablished
union might in the future be recognized by the employer as the bargain-
ing agent for the employees. 1 Another circuit court of appeals modified
a previous Board order which had required a company-dominated union
to be completely disestablished. 12 The court decreed that the employees
should be free at any election to choose the company union to represent
them and that the employer must be permitted to add to the posted notices
the qualification the company union would be disestablished only until
or unless it should be chosen by the employees to represent them.
The question of the permanence of the disestablishment order, how-
ever, was settled by the U. S. Supreme Court when it reversed the lower
court's decision and stated, ". . . the Board justifiably drew the inference
that this company-created union could not emancipate itself from habitual
subservience to its creator, and that in order to insure employees that
complete freedom of choice guaranteed by § 7, Independent must be
completely disestablished and kept off the ballot."'1 3 After this decision
the Fifth Annual Report of the NLRB could declare without qualifica-
tion: "Disestablishment must be complete, unconditional and perma-
1 N.L.R.B. 1 (1935), aff'd sub norn., NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
303 U.S. 261 (1938), Wheeling Steel Corp., 1 N.LR.B. 699 (1936), and Carlisle
Lumber Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 248 (1936), the respondents were ordered to withdraw all recog-
nition from the dominated labor organizations as the representatives of their employees
for purposes of collective bargaining. The term "disestablishment," which later came
to have a technical meaning, was apparently used in a dictionary sense. In one of two
other early cases, Atlas Bag & Burlap Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 292, 307 (1936), the Board
ordered the dominated organization to ". . . be dissolved and cease to exist"; in the
other, Lukens Steel Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 1009, 1013 (1937), the employer was ordered to
".. . take every possible legal means to secure the surrender of the Charter of . . . [the]
Association and to do everything in its power to secure its dissolution ... " Again,
"disestablishment" was not mentioned in any technical sense.
Yet, each of these cases involved employer domination of a labor organization in
violation of Section 8(2) of the Act, for which the Board, in other cases involving
similar fact situations, issued the standard order requiring the employer to completely
disestablish the labor organization as the collective bargaining representative of the
employees.
11. "We are of the opinion that the meaning of the order is sufficiently clear. It
does not direct that the League shall be dissolved, but merely that the petitioner cease
to recognize it as the collective bargaining representative of petitioner's employees. If
it should be established in the future, after the Board's order has become operative and
effected its purpose, that the League has been freely chosen by petitioner's employees
as their collective bargaining representative, we do not construe the order as preventing
proper recognition of the League as such." Swift & Co. v. NLRB, 106 F.2d 87, 95-96
(10th Cir. 1939).
12. NLRB v. Falk Corp., 106 F.2d 454, 456 (7th Cir. 1939), wdifying Falk Corp.,
6 N.L.R.B. 654 (1938).
13. NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453, 461 (1940).
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nent,' 4 meaning that once a union is disestablished, it can never be certi-
fied by the Board.' 5 The employees were left to the alternatives of a
rival union or no union at all. 6
The policy of the NLRB has been to issue the disestablishment order
only upon finding a violation of Section 8(2) of the Act.' 7 Under the
Wagner Act, when the Board found employer interference contravening
Section 8(1) and also concluded that affirmative action was necessary
in addition to the negative "cease and desist" order,' 8 it employed a lesser
remedy, ordering that the respondent employer "withhold recognition"
from the labor organization unless it was later certified by the Board;
14. 5 NLRB ANN. REP. 105 (1940).
Also it is interesting to note comment by the circuit court of appeals concerning
disestablishment in Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. NLRB, 129 F.2d 922, 931 (2d Cir. 1942),
as follows: "Nothing is gained and much time and effort is lost by a discussion of the
correct definition of 'disestablishment.' That word occurs nowhere in the Act. One
suspects that it is attractive because mouth-filling. We should not be bewitched by it.
It is merely a label for the allowable means to achieve enforcement where there has
been a violation of § 8(2) through 'domination' or 'interference,' in which event the
Board has broad statutory powers to prevent its continuance. In some cases the Board
may consider that posting of a notice of cessation of relations with a previously dom-
inated union is enough; in others, it may consider that it is sufficient if such relations
stop for a 'breathing spell.' In such a case as this the Board may lawfully decide that
nothing short of a permanent ban on company dealings with the tainted union will
effectuate the enforcement of the Act. The choice of remedies is for the Board."
15. See Carpenter Steel Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 670, 671 (1948).
16. Some employer representatives have complained that affiliated unions have
utilized the Board's disestablishment policies to deprive employees of the right freely to
choose a company union. See SmiTH, LABOR LAw 115 (2d ed. 1953).
17. Section 8(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "... to dominate
or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or con-
tribute financial or other support to it. . . ." Since the Taft-Hartley Amendment.
employer unfair labor practices are listed under Section 8(a), but for purposes of con-
venience this paper will speak of them in the manner in which they are designated by
the Wagner Act. E.g., §§ 8(1), 8(2).
In one early case, Atlanta Woolen Mills, 1 N.LR.B. 316 (1936), the Board found
that the evidence of an employer unfair labor practice was not sufficient to warrant a
finding of a violation of Section 8(2), although the acts were deemed a violation of
Section 8(1), which provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer ". . . to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7." Nevertheless, the Board ordered the labor organization to be disestablished
and justified its position by declaring that it was within the Board's discretion under
Section 10(c) ".... to require the taking of such affirmative action as will provide an
appropriate and effective remedy for any violations of any subdivision of Section 8."
Id. at 333. This case was not followed in subsequent decisions, and so it is probable that
at the time it was decided the Board was still in the process of devising and testing
the effect of various remedial orders prior to adopting a standard policy with respect
to each subdivision of Section 8.
18. "Section 8(1) ... serves as a general statement of unfair labor practices. The
Board has consistently held that any of the unfair labor practices specified in the other
subdivisions of Section 8 are also interference, restraint, and coercion in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed by the Act, and as such are violations of Section 8(1). In addition
any specific practices violating the rights of employees, which are not included under
the other subdivisions, are covered by these more general terms." 7 NLRB ANN. RE'.
45 (1942).
NOTES
in such a situation the Board would not certify the organization until
it became free from illegal interference.' 9
The presence of this organization in the plant, however, lent crucial
significance to the Board's action with regard to subsequent employer
recognition of an exclusive bargaining representative. Generally speak-
ing, there were three alternatives: Where a rival union had a majority
of the employees prior to the employer's unfair labor practices, the em-
ployer could be ordered to bargain with that union;20 where this was
not the case, the Board could order an election ;21 or it could leave the
question of elections to the initiative of the parties, requiring only that
the organization with which the employer had interfered not be recog-
nized without Board certification.22
The comparative severity of the disestablishment remedy is appar-
ent. Its ultimate justification seems to rest-ton two bases. The first was
expressed by the Board in the Wheeling Steel Corporation case :23
"Simply to order the respondent to cease supporting and
interfering with the councils would not set free the employee's
impulse to seek the organization which would most effectively
represent him. We cannot completely eliminate the force which
the respondent's power exerts upon the employee. . . . Even
though he would not have freely chosen the council as an
initial proposition, the employee, once having chosen, may by
force of a timorous habit, be held firmly to his choice. The
employee must be released from these compulsions .... -24
19. See Carpenter Steel Co., 76 N.LR.B. 670, 671 (1948). Compare note 10 supra.
The order of "withhold recognition until certified" should not be confused with those
orders which the Board rendered in the very early cases requiring the employer to "with-
draw all recognition" from the dominated organization.
20. E.g., Mt. Vernon Car Mfg. Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 500 (1939).
21. This may occur where a certification petition is pending before the Board at
the time the decision is rendered, e.g., Abinante & Nola Packing Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 1288
(1940); Condenser Corp. of America, 22 N.L.R.B. 347 (1940). It may take place where
the Board, on its own motion, provides for a future election, e.g., South Texas Coaches,
Inc., 22 N.L.R.B. 502 (1940).
22. E.g., Gerity Whitaker Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 393 (1941).
23. 1 N.L.RB. 699 (1936).
24 Id. at 710. Cf., e.g., Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1948);
Sebastian S. Kresge, 80 N.L.R.B. 329 (1948), vwdifyhtg. 77 N.LR.B. 212 (1948), which
hold that an order disestablishing an employer-dominated organization existing, in part,
for purposes not connected with collective bargaining, does not interfere with its func-
tioning as other than a labor organization.
A company-dominated organization existing solely for the purpose of providing
athletic, social, insurance, or other services for employees is not in violation of the Act.
Therefore, the litigious question often is whether or not the organization is a "labor
union" within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, which provides: "The term 'labor
organization' means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee repre-
sentation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
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The Board apparently is discussing the employee right to choose
freely a bargaining representative. But there is a further problem in
the evil of employer domination. A union subject to employer control
is not likely to represent employee interests adequately. In most cases
an organization, which is allied with the employer to the extent described
in the Wheeling Steel Corporation case, will also be subject to employer
control. 25 However, placing the issuance of the disestablishment order
on the first ground makes the ultimate issue in such cases turn upon the
psychological question of the effect which the presence of a particular
organization has upon employees. 26
The question of whether the organization is totally subservient to
the employer or merely subject to his interference necessarily requires
consideration of complex fact situations. As might be expected, the
cases do not single out any one activity but rather indicate a combina-
tion of acts by the employer which in totality result in a finding of
domination.27 To orient attention in the direction of the psychological
effect of the situation upon an employee is to throw weight upon the
concept of domination at its vaguest point. Indeed, the NLRB was
criticized during early administration of the Act for assuming too much
employee timidity in the face of employer actions.28
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." For a dis-
cussion of this problem, see Note, 27 VA. L. REv. 359, 360 (1941) and cases cited.
25. But see pp. 226-227 infra.
26. The Board apparently adopted the rationale of the Wheeling Steel Corporation
case as the policy reason for issuing the disestablishment order in future decisions. See
1 NLRB ANN. REP. 127 (1936); 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 147 (1937). In that context, the
Board's handling of the domination problem is strikingly similar to its approach to
control of preelection activities of employers and unions. Analogous issues of the coercive
effect of particular practices upon employee choice of a bargaining agent are made the
fulcrum upon which cases turn. See Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 790 (1952) ;
Kearney & Trecker Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951); General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B.
124 (1948); Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 349 (1945).
27. See 3 NLRB AN. REP. 112 (1938); Compare Characteristics of Company
Unions 230.
28. See Note, 27 VA. L. REv. 359, 377-378 (1941). No attempt is made here to
analyze the detailed fact situations in which the Board has ordered disestablishment.
Generally, the Board has issued the disestablishment order where the employer has
assisted the employees in forming the labor union or has formal control of it by pro-
visions in its constitution or by-laws; where, without such formal control, he has per-
sonally or through representatives, overtly dominated the organization; where the
domination once prevailed but has been suspended at the time the unfair labor charges
were filed; or where a successor to a previously disestablished organization has been
created. Id. at 365. As to the "successor union" cases, the Board holds that if any labor
organization is, in effect, a successor to a prior organization which has been found to
be company dominated, then the subsequent organization has the same disabilities attached
to it. If there is no cleavage or clear line of fracture between the "old" organization
and the "new" organization and no disavowal by the company of its illegal conduct with
respect to the "old" organization, the successor will be considered dominated also. See
statement of former Board Chairman Herzog, Hearings Before Conmnittee an Labor
and Public Welfare on S. 55 and S.I. Res. 22, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1912 (1947).
NOTES
Certainly it can be said that the Board in the early years made
extensive use of the disestablishment remedy,29 and there is some indica-
tion that it was going to great lengths to do so.3° Within a comparatively
few years the number of disestablishment orders issued annually declined
precipitously. 31 This decline can be attributed to several factors, among
which undoubtedly is the NLRB's realization of the vagueness of its
standards in applying disestablishment.
More basically, as employers realized that they could no longer main-
tain company-dominated unions, and as employees became more con-
scious of their own strength and bargaining potential, the Board realized
that the drastic remedy was no longer needed.82 In a case decided
in 1947, 33 a change in the Board's policy with respect to disestablishment
of successor unions may be perceived. The employer had assisted his
employees in organizing a social club.34 Three years later the Club voted
to reorganize as a formal labor union under the name of an association
in order that it might function solely for bargaining purposes. The
employer refused to recognize the new organization until a certification
election was held to determine if it represented a majority of the em-
ployees. The election was held under the direction of the Regional Board,
and the Association became the recognized representative.
The Board determined that, although the employer had withdrawn
all assistance to the Association after reorganization, it was a successor
union to the Club because the reorganization was effected by officials
selected by the Club members, the assets of the Club passed directly to
the Association, and the officials of the Club continued to direct the
Association's affairs during the drive for membership in the Associa-
29. During the years 1939, 1940, and 1941, there were, respectively, 245, 221 and
502 company unions disestablished by NLRB action. "Data for the years 1936, 1937,
and part of the data for 1938 is unavailable." 12 NLRB ANN. REP. 88 (1947).
30. This is particularly true where the union disestablished was the successor to a
previously dominated union. See Note, 27 VA. L. REv. 359, 376-377 (1941). But, in
general, the list of things an employer should have refrained from doing in order to
avoid a violation of Section 8(2) during the late 30's and early 40's was, indeed, impos-
ing, and the employer who attempted to see how close he could come to the line of
legality without overstepping it generally failed to avoid Board action against him. See
Crager, Company Unions Under the National Labor Relations Act, 40 MicH. L. REv.
831, 854 (1942).
31. 1942 (283); 1943 (205); 1944 (101); 1945 (54); 1946 (51); 1947 (36) 1948
(23); 1949 (15); 1950 (20); 1951 (11); 1952 (6). See 12 NLRB ANN. REP. 88(1947); 13 NLRB ANN. REP'. 106 (1948); 14 NLRB ANN. REP. 166 (1949); 15 NLRB
ANN. REP. 229 (1950); 16 NLRB ANN. REP. 295 (1951); 17 NLRB ANN. REP. 282
(1952).
32. In addition, probably fewer dominated-union cases were filed with the Board.
33. Detroit Edison Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 267 (1947).
34. The 'Club was determined by the Board to be a labor organization within the
terms of the Act because the representatives of the Club had discussed with the employer
problems concerning working conditions and wages as well as social affairs. Id. at 269.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tion. Thus, there was no "line of fracture or break in continuity" be-
tween the two organizations. Although the Board found that because
the Association was the successor to the Club, it, too, was dominated by
the employer,35 it only ordered that the employer withhold recognition
from the dominated Association until it was certified:
[T]he effects of this respondent's unfair labor practices
have to a large extent been dissipated. . . .The disestablish-
ment of a labor organization is a drastic remedy which . ..
has been employed with insufficient discrimination in recent
years. We ought, hereafter, to manifest fuller appreciation of
the factual differences between cases. Whatever reasons may
once have existed for directing disestablishment in every case
in which a violation of Section 8(2) was found, [it is doubted]
whether that remedy is invariably necessary today in order
to effectuate the policies of the Act. This is 1947, not 1935;
in the interim employees have learned much about protecting
their own rights and making their own choices with the full
facts before them. There are situations in which, because of
the passage of time, or the intervening attitude of an employer,
or both, it would appear unrealistic to assume that employees'
free choice is inhibited solely because an unaffiliated organiza-
tion to which many belong had an illicit beginning... [T]he
Board, in fixing the appropriate remedy, has tended to apply
the 'fracture theory' too rigidly to all situations. Under Sec-
tion 10(c) of the Act, remedy lies within our reasonable
discretion.... The leading Court cases upholding Board orders
of disestablishmhent do not require that the Board employ that
extreme remedy in every situation in which an organization
formed in violation of Section 8(2) remains, in ghostly aspect,
on the scene. They merely hold that the Board has the power
to take that step if it believes that that 'may be the only way
of wiping the slate clean.' ,,a0
The Board's language again indicates that its major concern was
the protection of employee freedom in choosing an organization to
represent them. This rather puzzling attitude can best be explained by
the context of rival unionism in which disestablishment cases arose. The
overwhelming majority of such cases has originated by petitions filed
by "outside" affiliated unions who hoped to represent employees in the
particular plant. In an effort to encourage selection of the company
35. There was also a finding that the employer interfered with the formation and
administration of the Club and gave the Club financial and other support in violation of
Section 8(2) of the Act. Id. at 273.
36. Id. at 278-9. Board member Houston joined in the order but contended that it
should also provide for complete disestablishment of the dominated organization as the
sole method by which the Board could dispel the effect of the employer's domination
and make available to the employees their rights under the Act. Id. at 281.
226
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-union and assure defeat of intruding unions, the employer almost invari-
ably coerced employee freedom to choose a bargaining representative.
On the other hand, determination of the adequacy with which an organi-
zation is representing employee interests requires a comparatively long
period of observation. Many company unions had their source in em-
ployer opposition to the Wagner Act, but few of them had bargaining
histories over an extended period because their affiliated rivals naturally
filed unfair labor practice complaints almost as soon as they met with
employer opposition.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the entire question of the
effectiveness of company unions as bargaining agents, dominated or not,
was and is not easily answered. The labor movement has always con-
sidered the restriction of a union to one plant or one company an unsus-
tainable handicap in the bargaining process, and several observers have
agreed.37 There is ground to believe that the authors of the Wagner
Act had a general antipathy toward company unions, but they clearly
did not intend to prohibit them.38 The Board may have preferred to avoid
this more delicate, if more basic, phase of the problem and to concentrate
upon employer coercion of the choice of bargaining agent. Even though
it has eschewed overt discussion of the more fundamental issue, its treat-
ment of nationally affiliated unions which are charged with being com-
pany dominated affords substantial evidence that it has not been unaware
that company domination raises issues beyond that of employee free
choice of an agent.
While administering the Wagner Act, the Board never issued a
disestablishment order against an affiliated local. In its eyes, this was
not because it was discriminating to the disadvantage of independent
unions and to the advantage of affiliated unions but rather because it
felt that ". . . assistance to a local union chartered by and subject to the
constitution and by-laws of the national organization cannot, in prac-
tice, extend to the point of constituting domination by the employer.
From the very character of the affiliation, the local group draws strength
and direction from sources outside the employer's control; it accordingly
cannot, at least for any extended period of time, be used as a mere
utensil of an employer to deprive employees of the free exercise of the
rights guaranteed by the Act."' 39
37. See Characteristics of Company Unions 17-18; Crager, mpra note 30, at 832-
833; Note, 40 CoL. L. REv. 278, 308-309 (1940). It is possible that the Board's differen-
tial treatment of nationally affiliated locals indicated an acceptance of this view.
38. Crager, supra note 30, at 833 et seq.
39. Statement of former Chairman Herzog on pending labor legislation, Hearings,
supra note 28, at 1912.
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. Therefore, under the Wagner Act, when the evidence presented
was sufficient for the Board to have found domination or interference
within the meaning of Section 8(2) if the organization involved had
been an independent union, the Board instead would hold that in the
case of an affiliated union, the employer only had restrained, coerced,
or interfered with the employees' rights in violation of Section 8(1). 40
The resultant remedy issued was the standard order for violations of
Section 8(1) -- "withhold recognition, from the coerced organization
until certified by the Board. '4
1
If the NLRB was merely concerned with employee free choice of
a bargaining agent, its attempts to draw a distinction between independent
and affiliated unions were clearly wrong. Surely an affiliated local, in
the mind of the employee, could, as against its rivals, become so identi-
fied as a favorite of the employer that its continued presence would have
a coercive effect upon employee free choice. The Board's argument goes
to the question of whether such a union can long remain subject to
complete employer control. International unions undoubtedly have had
a general policy against allowing any of their locals to be so dominated, 42
but there is no reason to expect them to have a similar policy opposing
an employer's favoring them over rival organizations.
The Eightieth Congress, at any rate, believed that the Board had
discriminated against independent unions, consequently, the Taft-Hartley
Act proscribed this practice.43 It has been noted that this amendment
could be interpreted as an abolition of the disestablishment order itself
(since this would be one method of attaining equality of treatment) or
as a direction to employ the remedy against affiliated unions with the
fervor characterizing its use against independents. 44 In either case the
equality of treatment required was more than a balanced dispensation
of the remedy; the Board could no longer continue its practice of finding
a violation of Section 8(2) in cases involving company unions where
40. See Note, 40 COL. L. REV. 278, 304-306 (1940), and the cases cited.
41. 13 NLRB ANN. REa,. 50 (1948). The Board, however, would scrutinize the
character of the international to determine its efficacy as a bar to domination. See Atlas
Underwear Co., 18 N.L.R.B. 338 (1939), discussed in Note, 40 CoL. L. REV. 278, 305
n.228 (1940).
42. Id. at 305.
43. "[I]n determining whether a complaint shall issue alleging a violation of Sec-
tion 8(a) (1) or Section 8(a) (2), and in deciding such cases, the same regulations and
rules of decision shall apply irrespective of whether or not the labor organization affected
is affiliated with a labor organization national or international in scope." 61 STAT. 147
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (Supp. 1951).
44. MILLIS AND BROWN, Fiom THE WAGNERAcr To- TA.FT-HARTLEY 427 (1950).
The same writers suggest that Congress may have intended th* first alternative. Ibid.
Adoption of the second might hamper the use of the disestabishment remedy, rather
than increase the frequency with which it was issued.
NOTES
it would only find a violation of Section 8(1) if the union in question
were affiliated with an international organization. 4
5
Whether the intent of Congress was to abolish the disestablishment
remedy or to hamper somewhat its application to company unions by
forcing the Board to be as circumspect with them as it had been with
affiliated unions, fundamental changes in American labor relations had
already reduced that problem to minor significance.46 Correspondingly,
one could not say that this portion of the Taft-Hartley Amendment
burdened the NLRB's attempts to cope with the problem which company
domination had historically presented. But if the day of the company-
dominated independent was past, the era of rival unionism certainly was
not. As long as an employer's aid and influence may be enlisted by any
one organization in such struggles, the Board must face the problem
of devising, or choosing from among already existing remedies, the
means to preserve the rights protected by the Act.47
It is in dealing with affiliated unions that the Taft-Hartley change
in Section 10(c) presents more pressing problems. Although from the
point of view of the employee right to choose freely a bargaining agent
one may agree with Congress that differential treatment of affiliated
unions would be discriminatory, the Board's argument that the local of
a strong international cannot long be dominated carries considerable
weight. Nevertheless, if it wished to retain the use of the disestablish-
ment order to deal with those few cases of traditional .domination which
might arise, the Board would have to make findings of Section 8(2)
violations by affiliated unions coextensive with those found with respect
to independents; the influence which the international could have in
preventing total employer control could not be considered.48
The Board chose to retain th6 disestablishment remedy and estab-
lished the basis for continued differentiation of affiliated union problems
from the traditional domination situation in the Carpenter Steel case,49
decided in 1948. The opinion states:
45. See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Managentent Relations Act, 1947, 61 H. v.
L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1947), and the evidence cited.
46. Note the language of the Board in the Detroit Edison cage, quoted p. 226 supra.
47. National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (Supp.
1951).
48. Setting aside the question of the strength which an affiliated union might draw
from the parent body, such union might still, as a matter of fact, never be involved in
situations requiring a finding of 8(2) violations. In light of the Congressional order
to change its practices and the Board's previous policy of finding 8(1) violations against
affiliated unions, it would have been, practically speaking, impossible for it to continue
0to do so.
49. 76 N.L.R.B. 670 (1948).
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"Upon similar facts, the Board will hereafter apply the same
remedy to both affiliated and unaffiliated labor organizations.
S.. In all cases in which we find that an employer has dom-
inated, or interfered with, or contributed support to a labor
organization, or has committed any of these proscribed acts,
we will find such conduct a violation of Section 8(a) (2) of
the Act, as amended in 1947, regardless of whether the organi-
zation involved is affiliated. Where we find that an employer's
unfair labor practices have been so extensive as to constitute
domination of the organization, we shall order its disestablish-
ment, whether or not it be affiliated. The Board believes that
disestablishment is still necessary as a remedy, in order effec-
tively to remove the consequences of an employer's unfair labor
practices and to make possible a free choice of representatives,
in those cases, perhaps few in number, in which an employer's
control of any labor organization has extended to the point of
actual domination. But when the Board finds that an employer's
unfair labor practices were limited to interference and support
and never reached the point of domination, we shall only order
that recognition be withheld until certification. . ...,
It is significant that the union involved here was an independent.
By announcing a new criterion, support, which would not result in a
disestablishment order against an unaffiliated union contravening Section
8(2), the Board retained the prerogative to refrain from disestablishing
affiliated unions upon similar findings of 8(2) violations while still com-
plying with the Congressional injunction against discrimination. 51
The case has a further effect upon the Board's use of the disestab-
lishment remedy which is of extreme importance. By introducing the
concept of support as something less than domination, the NLRB for
the first time made applicable to situations involving all unions the dis-
50. Id. at 672-3. In this case, the employer had participated and assisted in insti-
tuting an independent labor organization comprised of a joint employee-management
committee. The employee representatives of the Committee were elected from different
departments, but none could be representatives with less than one year's service with the
company; a representative's status could be severed by terminating his employment or
by transferring him to another department; minutes of meetings had to be approved by
management prior to posting; no dues were required, and the company financed the
expenses of the organization by donating proceeds of candy and milk machines installed
on company property. No bargaining contract was ever negotiated; rather, bargaining
was confined to grievances only. Throughout the existence of the Committee the em-
ployer continued to recognize it as the exclusive bargaining representative for the
employees, except for a five-month period, at the employer's request, when a rival CIO
union filed a representation petition. The Committee began functioning again without
the employer questioning its majority status after the CIO was defeated in a consent
election which did not involve the Committee. The Board found that the Committee was
dominated and ordered it disestablished.
51. The Detroit Edison decision accomplished the same thing for the Board, but
it was a "successor-union" case. The Carpenter Steel dictum simply does on a broader
basis what Detroit Edison does with regard to successor unions.
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tinction which had been inherent in its preferential treatment of affiliated
unions prior to the Taft-Hartley Act. The basis upon which the NLRB
had then refused to utilize the disestablishment order was that affiliated
unions could not long remain subject to employer control. It has already
been suggested that employer control of a labor organization is the true
rationale upon which the disestablishment order should rest and that
the theory of the Wheeling Steel Corporation case merges the problem
of domination with the problem of employer coercion of employee free
choice. The two issues are distinct, though, as a matter of fact, both
often appear together. The Carpenter Steel decision, then, designates
employer control as domination and distinguishes it from coercion, which
was henceforth to be controlled by findings of support and the withhold-
recognition remedy.52
This is borne out by decisions subsequent to Carpenter Steel. Where
disestablishment has been used, there has been clear evidence that the
organization in question was actually subject to employer control ;53 often
it was not an active bargaining representative.54 In two cases, although
the employer exercised no coercion over employee choice between the
company union and any other organization, disestablishment was
ordered.55
52. The Wheeling Steel Corporation case rationale, under modern conditions, is
too weak to justify the severity of the disestablishment order. The language of the
Detroit Edison case is persuasive in this respect. See p. 226 supra.
53. See, e.g., Crosby Chemicals, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 791, 820 (1949), which states:
"Because of the Respondent's illegal conduct with regard to it, [the Independent] is
incapable of serving the Respondent's employees as a genuine collective bargaining
agency." Generally speaking, these are cases of overt control, i.e., control through the
by-laws or constitution of the organization or more directly, through employer repre-
sentatives. [Cf. Note, 27 VA. L. Rxv. 359, 366-367 (1941).] See H. N. Thayer Co.,
99 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1952); Delores, Inc., 98 N.L.R.B. 550 (1952); Coal Creek Coal
Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 14 (1951); Bryan Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1331 (1951); Sun Oil Co.,
89 N.L.R.B. 833 (1950); C. Ray Randall Mfg. Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 140 (1950); Florida
Telephone Corp., 88 N.L.R.B. 1429 (1950); Madix Asphalt Roofing Corp., 85 N.L.R.B.
26 (1949); Superior Engraving Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 215 (1949); Duro Test Corp., 81
N.L.R.B. 976 (1949); Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1948); Clark
Phonograph Record Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 34 (1948); Red Arrow Freight Lines, Inc., 77
N.L.R.B. 859 (1948); Rathbun Molding Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 1019 (1948); Vogue-
Wright Studios, Inc., 76 N.LR.B. 773 (1948). In a few cases there are lesser indicia
of that control, but the inference of its existence is quite strong; see Galyan's Super
Market, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 298 (1950); Sebastian S. Kresge, 80 N.L.R.B. 329 (1948)
todifying 77 N.L.R.B. 212 (1948).
54. See Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp., 97 N.L.R.B. 332 (1951); E. A. Laboratories,
Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 711 (1949) nodifying 80 N.L.R.B. 625 (1948); Russell Mfg. Co.,
82 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1949); Wrought Iron Range Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 487 (1948); Pacific
Moulded Products Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1140 (1948).
55. Farrington Mfg. Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1416 (1951); Axelson Mfg. Co., 88 N.L.R.B.
761 (1950). In the latter case, the board adopted, in toto, a trial examiner's report which
states at one point: "To be sure, the record discloses a friendly attitude on the part of
the Respondent toward its employees; it establishes no hostility toward outside unions;
it is devoid of evidence of any design to coerce employees in the selection of their repre-
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Since 1947 there have been but two cases in which disestablishment
orders have been rendered against affiliated unions. In Jack Smith Bev-
erages,56 the company had solicited its employees in one branch plant to
sign a statement repudiating a CIO organizational effort. Immediately
thereafter the company's president and branch plant manager helped a
representative of an AFL Teamsters' local induce employees to sign union
membership cards and checkoff authorizations. Without bargaining, the
company immediately granted the local's request for checkoff privileges.
It also paid dues to the local for the benefit of employees but made no
deductions from their wages. At the same time, the company gave written
recognition to the AFL local knowing that the CIO local had petitioned
for a representative election. Thereafter, the AFL local made no effort
to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with the company and
held no meetings for nearly a year. 57
Obviously, the Teamsters' local was not an effective agency for col-
lective bargaining but was purely a subterfuge to foreclose organization
of the plant to the rival CIO union. The analogy to the disestablishment
cases involving independent unions is apparent. The Polynesian Arts
case, 58 decided in 1952, presents a less obvious instance of domination.
Here, employer activities, coercing employees into an AFL union
and manifesting pronounced hostility to a CIO union, were similar to
those of the employer in Jack Smith Beverages. 9 However, a collective
bargaining agreement was negotiated and signed. The factor which de-
prived this bargaining relationship of its effectiveness was the manner in
sentatives." Id. at 777. And elsewhere, it is said: "The employees' only choice is there-
fore between the Plan and the selection of some other labor organization as their bargain-
ing representative; neither of which alternatives they may regard as wholly acceptable.
The right of organization is not so circumscribed. This assurance of control by the
Respondent over the structure of the Plan seriously impairs its capacity to act as an
employee representative." Id. at 772.
56. 94 N.L.R.B. 1401 (1951).
57. The Board stated: "In view of our agreement with the Trial Examiner's find-
ing that Respondent dominated as well as interfered with and supported Teamsters Local
164, we have no alternative under the present statute but to order the Respondent to
disestablish that labor organization." Id. at 1405. On appeal, the order was modified
such as to restrict the disestablishment order to the one branch plant since there was
no evidence of domination at any of the Company's other plants. NLRB v. Jack Smith
Beverages, Inc., 202 F.2d -100 (6th Cir. 1953).
58. 100 N.L.R.B. 542 (1952).
59. In the Polyiwsian Arts case, the company's president called a meeting of all
employees on company property and introduced to them the AFL organizers stating
that he desired the employees to cooperate with them. Later the company superintendent
and assistant superintendent accompanied the AFL representatives throughout the plant
distributing application cards for membership. The president and his wife, on separate
occasions, interrogated employees as to whether they had joined and made remarks to
coerce them into joining the AFL. Surveillance was taken of employee attendance at
rival CIO organizational meetings, and one employee was discharged and another trans-
ferred to a less desirable job because of interest in CIO activities.
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which negotiations took place. 0 The employer and AFL representatives
drafted a contract which they jointly presented at an employee meeting.
Upon the first vote the contract was rejected, and the employer stated
that he ". . was 'quite displeased' with the results of the vote and
remarked that 'he would like to see the sheep from the goats and the
ones that was against him step out the door.' "61 After some revision,
a second vote was taken, and the contract was accepted. Having been
thus negotiated, the contract was found by the trial examiner to be
" ... a means whereby self-organization and genuine collective bargain-
ing by the employees is frustrated. '62
It would be difficult to maintain that the representatives of the AFL
in Polynesian Arts, or for that matter, in Jack Smith Beverages, were
subject to the control of the employer. To a degree, then, neither of
these cases can be categorized as instances of traditional company dom-
ination. The Teamsters, at least, are a powerful and dynamic organiza-
tion ;63 intense rivalry among AFL, CIO, and other international organi-
zations is not novel. 4 Nevertheless, the evil of the tactics employed in
60. There is no indication that the wages, hours, or working conditions specified
in the contract were anything but reasonable. The Board adopted the trial examiner's
opinion which recommends that the employer not be required to vary the ". . . sub-
stantive features of its relations with the employees which Respondent has established
in performance of the said contract or any revision, extension, renewal, or modification
thereof." Id. at 554.
61. Id. at 547. The AFL representatives warned him, however, that he could not
do this, and so the employees were not separated.
62. Id. at 554. There was also a union-security clause in the contract which, at
that time, was illegal. Compare p. 235 infra.
63. Miller, Dave Beck Cotnes Out of tHie West, The Reporter, Dec. 8, 1953, p. 20.
64. Rival unionism has persisted since the early days of union development. One
view is that it results in a serious waste of time, money and effort to have strife among
the ranks of the labor groups. The goal of labor forces is lost sight of when the fear
of one group is that another is encroaching upon its own areas. See GALENsoN, RIVAL
UNIONISM IN T3HE UNITED STATES 37-40 (1940). Yet, as one author points out, "Leader-
ship rivalry is the life-blood of unionism in the United States. After all, the American
trade union is pragmatic to the core, neutral in ideology, and weak in political purpose.
In the absence of competition for the allegiance of workers, there would be little else
to insure its militance and guarantee its role as an agency of protest. Moreover, rivalry
has been the most effective stimulus to organize the unorganized. Let the reader ask
himself if the labor movement would be as far along as it is today, in terms of total
membership, had there not occurred the split between the AFL and the CIO in the
1930's." Ross, TRADE UNION WAGE PoLIcy 63 (1948).
There have been recent attempts to avoid such conflicts between AFL'and CIO
unions. See AFL, CIO Sign No-Raid Agreement, Business Week, June 13, 1953, p. 162.
But see Miller, supra note 63, at 22, col. 2.
One of the weapons sometimes used by unions is to offer employers drastic conces-
sions on wages and hours in exchange for help against competing unions. See GALENSON,
loc. cit. supra. It has been suggested that this is one of the methods by which United
Electrical Workers have maintained their hold on some plants after being expelled from
the CIO. See Scanlon, The Communist-Dominated Union Problem, 28 Noan DAMIE
LAw. 458, 465 (1953).
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these two cases is similar enough to the traditional evil of domination
to justify the use of disestablishment. In both, bargaining was removed
from employee control, and, in Jack Smith Beverages, the representa-
tives of the International manifested no concern for employee interests.65
In this regard a new problem arises. Because the disestablishment
order perpetually prohibits the union from being recognized by the
employer as a bargaining representative and also prevents it from ever
being certified by the Board, such an order might apply not only to the
local organization but also could go so far as to obstruct any local which
the international organization desires later to establish in the plant. If
the order involved the latter interpretation, disestablishment, indeed,
would be a powerful weapon in the hands of the Board to pit against
competing international labor organizations.66
It may be, however, that the Board will allow a different local,
although affiliated with the same international labor organization, to be
certified later in the same plant and will use the same reasoning as it
presently employs with respect to independent unions which are suc-
cessors to prior company-dominated independent unions; there must be
public disavowal by the employer of the old organization and a change
in the new one which results in a clear line of fracture between the
two organizations before the new local may receive certification. This
might be insufficient; for example, in the Jack Smith Beverages situa-
tion, the taint of employer domination might easily pervade this suc-
cessor organization since it is still a Teamsters affiliate. This would be
particularly true if the same district representative was responsible for
the organizational drives of both locals.
The Board's reluctance to use disestablishment against affiliated
locals is, thus, easily understandable. The withhold recognition order,
65. Disestablishment may be somewhat more difficult to justify in Polynesian Arts
since a contract was negotiated. The manner in which it was forced on the employees
is the strongest basis for concluding that it did not represent healthy collective bargain-
ing. Of course, it may be argued that, as a general rule, the power of any international
over its locals and its control over the union side of the bargaining process is nearly
complete. See Neufeld, State of the Unions in THE HousE or LABOR, 5, 14-20 (Hardman
and Neufeld ed. 1951).
66. In Jack Smith Beverages the Board noted that "[t]he Teamster International
is not a party to this proceeding, and the order herein issues only against the Local."
Jack Smith Beverages, Inc., 94 N.L.R.B. 1401, 1405 n.14 (1951). There is no indica-
tion that either notice or hearing was afforded the international whose local was dom-
inated in the Polynesian Arts case. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197
(1938), held that the Board cannot abrogate a contract between an employer and a
union unless the union is given notice and an opportunity to be heard. See SmiTH, LABOR
LAW 118 (2d ed. 1953) ; Notes, 40 CoL. L. REv. 278, 306 (1940) ; 6 U. oF CHri. L. REv.
319 (1939). The Board conceivably could continue to proceed in the manner adopted in
Jack S ith Beverages and thus deprive itself of the power to issue any order against
the international.
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with its flexibility and its tendency to resolve the rival unionism problem
by the election process, seems more desirable. Where an employer clearly
favors one organization, a rival union has three possible methods of
attack: It can embark upon a membership drive in an attempt to raid
the preferred union; thus, if it could gain majority status then employer
recognition or a certification election, at least temporarily, would eliminate
its adversary. However, in most cases, the employer and the rival union
have entered into contracts with durations of one or more years; the
Board has consistently held that such agreements bar redetermination
of representatives until the expiration date is imminent. 7 It can encour-
age its adherents to petition for a decertification election to test the
majority status of its rival, s but, again, the Board will apply the "con-
tract bar" principles.6 9 It can file unfair labor practice charges against
the employer, and if there is a finding of interference or support, circum-
vent the various obstacles to elections by means of a withhold recognition
order with its attendant abrogation of the offending contract.70
It should be noted that former Board Chairman Herzog felt that
the withhold recognition order was itself too severe in many cases of
employer support. Where the support took the form of a union-security
clause, he favored annulment of that clause of the contract and reliance
upon election procedures, either certification or decertification, for the
protection of Section 7 rights.7 1 A disestablishment order might give
rival affiliated locals unhampered opportunity to organize a plant, par-
ticularly in view of the difficulties surrounding the question of whether
the order would apply to internationals.
67. See 17 NLRB ANN. REP. 37 et seq. (1952). The Board has applied this rule to
contracts as long as five years in duration. See, e.g., General Motors Corp., 102 N.L.R.B.
No. 115 (Feb. 1953); 17 NLRB ANN. REp. 51 n.13a (1952).
68. This is a new type of election introduced by the Taft-Hartley Amendment.
Any employee or union can request that an election be held to determine if the union
which is acting as the bargaining agent of the employees has majority representation,
either as a result of a previous election or the employer's voluntary recognition. 61 STAT.
144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (A) (ii) (Supp. 1951). If, as a result of the election,
the union is found to have lost its majority representation, it will lose its rights to bar-
gain with the employer. See 13 NLRB ANN. REP. 19 et seq. (1948).
69. See Snow & Nealley Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 390 (1948).
70. See Knickerbocker Plastic Co., 104 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1953); Sunbeam Corp.,
99 N.L.R.B. 546 (1952); Mundet Cork Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 1142 (1951); Monolith
Portland Cement Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1951); Stewart-Warner Corp., 94 N.LIR.B.
607 (1951); Harrison Sheet Steel Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 81 (1951); Hollywood Ranch Mar-
ket, 93 N.L.R.B. 1147 (1951); Ronney & Sons Furniture Mfg. Co., 93 N.LR.B. 1049
(1951) ; United Hoisting Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1642 (1951); Peerless Quarries, Inc., 92
N.L.R.B. 1194 (1951); Meyer & Welch, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 1102 (1950); Spiegel, Inc.,
91 N.L.R.B. 647 (1950); Von's Grocery Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 504 (1950); Salant & Salant,
Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 215 (1949); Sioux City Brewing Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 1061 (1949). It
should be noted that contracts conflicting with the policies of the Act do not bar elec-
tions. See 17 NLRB ANN. REP'. 39 (1952).
71. Strauss Stores Corp., 94 N.L.R.B. 440 (1951).
